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Abstract: We demonstrate that the fatal crash of El Al Flight 1862 might have
been avoided by using MPC-based fault-tolerant control. Simulation on a detailed
nonlinear model shows that it is possible to reconfigure the controller so that the
aircraft is flown successfully down to ground level, without entering the condition
in which it was lost. We use a reference-model based approach, in which an MPC
controller attempts to restore the original functionality of the pilot’s controls.
For the purposes of simulation, we emulate the pilot by another MPC controller,
running at a lower sampling rate. We assume in this paper that an FDI function
delivers information about actuator damage, and about changes to aerodynamic
coefficients in the failed condition.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In (Maciejowski, 1997a; Maciejowski, 1997b) it
was argued that Model Predictive Control (MPC)
provides a suitable ‘implementation architecture’
for fault-tolerant control. The representation of
both faults, and of control objectives, is relatively
natural and straightforward in MPC. Actuator
faults such as jams and slew-rate reductions can
be represented by modifying the constraints in
the MPC problem definition (Camacho and Bor-
dons, 1999; Maciejowski, 2002). Other faults can
be represented by modifying the internal model
used by MPC — either detailed modifications
to a detailed first-principles model, of the kind
being used increasingly in the process industries,
or modifications of the overall behaviour of a
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‘black-box’ model. In addition, MPC has a de-
gree of fault-tolerance to actuator faults under
certain conditions, even if the fault is not de-
tected (Maciejowski, 1998).
The previous paragraph assumes that at least the
effects of a (possibly multiple) fault can be iden-
tified. This is undoubtedly the most difficult part
of solving the fault-tolerant control problem —
although this difficulty is being radically affected
by the availability of self-diagnosing actuators and
sensors, and increasingly effective condition moni-
toring schemes. Nevertheless this assumption will
be maintained in this paper, in order to show, by
careful investigation of a specific historical inci-
dent, that it is at least plausible — no more will
be claimed here — that MPC can provide effective
solutions for fault-tolerant control.
The possibility of fault-tolerant control arises only
if there is, in some sense, enough redundancy in
the system being controlled to allow the effects of
a fault to be in some way circumvented. Flight
control is a promising application area for fault-
tolerant control, because aircraft, in addition to
being very fully instrumented, usually have some
actuator redundancy. Civilian airliners, for exam-
ple, have spoilers (air brakes) which are some-
times used to provide a rolling moment at low
speeds, additional to that available from conven-
tional ailerons. Advanced aircraft concepts, such
as the ‘flying wing’, promise many multi-function
control surfaces, each capable of being deflected
independently of the others.
There have been several instances of aircraft inci-
dents in which the pilot(s) has successfully used
the redundancy of actuators to save an aircraft
from an apparently hopeless failure condition.
Perhaps the most spectacular is the well-known
Sioux City DC-10 incident (Hughes and Dorn-
heim, 1989), in which the aircraft was saved de-
spite total loss of hydraulic power, by clever ma-
nipulation of the thrust from the two surviving
engines. There have also been several incidents
in which the crew has not managed to save the
aircraft, although post-flight analysis showed that
it was possible to do so. Such incidents illustrate
that there is scope for automatic fault-tolerant
flight control systems. In this paper we investi-
gate one such incident, that of El Al Flight 1862,
which lost two engines on taking off from Schiphol
Airport in Amsterdam.
Before proceeding, let us address one aspect which
is sometimes raised as an objection to our concept
of fault-tolerant flight control — whether such
a flight control law could ever be accepted and
certified. We point out that it is not necessary
for such a system to be operating continuously.
It could, for example, be activated only by an
express command from the pilot. And once ac-
tivated, it need not be thought of as a kind of au-
topilot, taking over from the human pilot; it could
form no more than an advisory system, proposing
courses of action, or showing consequences (ahead
of real time) of actions initiated by the pilot.
2. ROBUST, ADAPTIVE AND
FAULT-TOLERANT CONTROL
How does ‘fault-tolerant’ control differ from ‘ro-
bust’ or ‘adaptive’ control? It is not clear that,
given a flight control system, it is possible to
distinguish whether it is ‘robust’ or ‘adaptive’
from observation of its behaviour (Wang and
Zames, 1991). The same is probably true of a
‘fault-tolerant’ control system. However, exami-
nation of its internal structure (algorithms) may
reveal into which of these categories it falls. Intu-
itively, ‘adaptive’ systems can cope with a greater
range of variations in system behaviour and exter-
nal environment than ‘robust’ systems. But much
of the literature of both fields assumes that the
objectives and performance specifications of the
control system remain unchanged. Some of the
literature makes much more severe assumptions,
for example that the plant under control under-
goes parameter variations only, while its structure
remains unchanged.
In our view ‘fault-tolerant’ control certainly con-
siders the possibility of structural changes in the
plant being controlled (including changes in dy-
namic behaviour, changes in available actuators,
and changes in available sensors), as well as the
possibility that control objectives may need to be
changed. In this paper we consider an example
in which major structural changes occur to the
plant. We do not address directly the question
of changing control objectives here. However, the
architecture which we adopt leaves a human op-
erator (in this case the pilot of the aircraft) in
the loop. Although our reconfiguration attempts
to restore the initial effects of the pilot’s controls,
even in the failed condition, one can to some
extent rely on the pilot’s experience to moderate
the demands made of the aircraft, and in this way
modify the control objectives. One could argue
that if the reconfiguration compensated perfectly
for the effects of the fault, then the presence of
the fault might be hidden from the pilot. However,
this is unlikely to be the case, and one can imagine
other indicators being given to the pilot that there
is a problem; for example, some measure of the
reconfiguration of actuators — unusual patterns
of use — could be devised.
An extensive survey of fault-tolerant control is
given by (Patton, 1997). In this survey ‘robust
control’ is included in the category of ‘passive
fault-tolerance’, whereas both adaptive control
and reconfigurable control are considered to be
included in ‘active fault-tolerance’. The survey
also rightly emphasises the importance of using,
rather than replacing, a human operator.
3. PILOT-BASED FAULT-TOLERANT
FLIGHT CONTROL
Of the 421 fatal accidents involving large jet
aircraft between 1990 and 1999, not one was
caused by loss of pilot (Civ, 2000). Because of
this fact, we make the assumption that for large
passenger planes there will always be a pilot (or
several) available to fly the plane. In a failure
situation the pilot is a valuable resource who must,
if possible, be utilised. Removing him from the
loop is a last resort and should only be done if it
can be shown that he cannot fly the plane. For this
reason, we propose a method which, if possible,
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compensates for failures while allowing the pilot
to continue flying the plane.
A sufficient condition for ‘pilot fly-ability’ is for
the aircraft to operate in a fashion which is close
to its nominal specification, i.e., from the pi-
lot’s point of view, the column, wheel, pedal and
throttle inputs cause close to the same effect as
they do on the working plane. This can be cast
as a constrained model-following problem. Figure
1 contains a box labelled ‘Fault-Tolerant Con-
troller’, which comprises three components: the
block ‘FDI’ which performs identification of the
fault’s effects (and whose presence we assume, as
discussed above), a ‘Reference Model’ which uses
pilot commands to generate a reference trajec-
tory for the aircraft’s state vector, and the block
MPCreconfig which is an MPC controller whose
objective is to track the reference trajectory, using
the output of ‘FDI’ to update its internal model,
constraints, etc. The pilot gives commands to the
reference model and the goal of the controller
is to cause the plane to track the resultant tra-
jectory. At each time step, the MPC controller
chooses an input sequence which minimises the
difference between the predicted future trajectory,
given by the reference model under the assump-
tion that the pilot’s inputs are constant over the
prediction horizon, and the predicted trajectory
of the aircraft, computed from the FDI model. A
very similar concept has previously been proposed
by (Pachter et al., 1995), and a less similar ‘model-
matching’ concept has been proposed by (Yu and
Jonckheere, 1999).
We propose the use of a model-following MPC
controller in this application for several reasons.
As stated above, MPC is a good framework for
fault-tolerant control, as many kinds of aircraft
failures can be handled online in an adaptive fash-
ion via modifications to the internal model. The
achievable performance of an aircraft will often
be reduced after a failure. This too can be dealt
with via MPC through changes to the objective
function or through the use of a multi-objective
formulation as discussed in, for example (Kerrigan
and Maciejowski, 2002). Finally, the loss of some
actuators will often require the remaining controls
to be driven to their limits, requiring any fault-
tolerant scheme to deal with actuator constraints
which, again, can be handled naturally in MPC.
There are three key benefits of this formulation.
First, it is unlikely that any fault-tolerant method
which takes full control of the aircraft during an
emergency would be used while there is a pilot
available to fly. Therefore, keeping the pilot in
the loop is desirable in any fault-tolerant flight
control scheme. Second, the controller benefits
from the heuristic knowledge and experience of
the pilot. Finally, the model-following formulation
implies that the damaged plane will respond to
pilot input, if possible, in a way similar to that for
which he was trained. This behaviour will reduce
the need for pilots to be trained for particular
failure situations and will free them from learning
the effects of a failure on the aircraft and trying
to compensate for the dynamics of a faulty plane
during an emergency. The assumption behind our
approach is that there are too many possible
failure scenarios for pilots to be trained explicitly
for each of them.
4. EL AL FLIGHT 1862
4.1 Scenario
On 4 October 1992, a Boeing 747-200F freighter
flying out of Schiphol Airport in Amsterdam suf-
fered separation of both engines from the star-
board wing. Despite this failure, the crew con-
tinued flying for almost 15 minutes, giving con-
siderable time for identification of the failure and
for the online design of a new controller. At the
end of that period, however, the crew lost con-
trol, and the aircraft crashed into an apartment
building, causing considerable loss of life. This
particular incident is a good test case for studying
fault-tolerant control for several reasons. First,
the plane was clearly controllable, as the crew
stayed in the air for almost 15 minutes after the
failure. Second, despite the fact that considerable
time was available, current emergency procedures
could not handle the situation as the plane did
eventually crash. Finally, there was sufficient dam-
age to the plane to make it extremely difficult
to fly, thus making it a challenging and inter-
esting problem. A detailed 6 degree-of-freedom
nonlinear Simulink model has been developed by
M.H.Smaili, who also showed by careful analysis
of the recovered flight data that it was possible to
fly the aircraft beyond the point at which the crew
lost control. All details of the incident, and the
simulation model used in this section, are taken
from (Smaili, 1997).
Modern aircraft are designed to be controllable
despite multiple single-wing engine failures with-
out separation. However, due to the damage to
the right wing caused by the separation of the
engines, there was a significant loss of both lateral
and directional control:
• Right wing leading edge severely damaged
• Right wing leading edge flaps partially lost
• Right outboard aileron floating
• No outboard aileron available, caused by
outboard trailing edge flaps failure
• Loss of six out of ten spoilers
• Unusually long lagging behind of the lower
rudder (for unknown reasons)
• Reduced effectiveness of right-hand inboard
aileron, because of disturbed airflow caused
by right-wing damage and loss of pylon no. 3
• Engines no. 1 and 2 at high thrust settings
4.2 Simulation
For the purposes of demonstration, a ‘pilot’ is
needed to control the plane and give wheel, pedal,
throttle and column inputs to the fault-tolerant
controller. A second MPC controller is used for
this purpose, which has the reference plane as its
internal model, in order to track forward velocity
(v), sideslip (β), flight path angle (γ), and the
heading derivative (χ˙). The second MPC con-
troller is shown as the block labelled MPCpilot
in Figure 1.
The Boeing 747 has a flight control system which
maps the pilot’s commands in the form of throttle,
wheel, rudder and column inputs to control in-
puts, which consist of: four engine throttles, two
inboard and two outboard ailerons, ten spoilers,
two inboard and two outboard elevators and the
lower and upper rudders. In order to make the
actuators independently accessible by the fault-
tolerant controller this flight control system has
been removed from the simulation, and has been
replaced by the fault-tolerant controller shown in
Figure 1. The reader is referred to (Jones, 2002)
for details.
The simulations presented in this paper attempt
to replicate the conditions during Flight El Al
1862 shortly before the pilot lost control: the
aircraft is initially flying at an altitude of 1500m, a
speed of 128m/s and an angle of attack of 8◦. The
test reference trajectory is similar to that which
was required for Flight El Al 1862 to line up with
the runway, including both right and left turns
which test the ability of the controller to handle
the asymmetric nature of the damaged aeroplane.
4.3 Fault-tolerant MPC design
The fault-tolerant MPC controller (inner loop in
Figure 1) runs at a frequency of 10 Hz, which
is chosen to be faster than the fastest mode
of the Boeing 747. The ‘pilot emulator’ MPC
(outer loop in Figure 1) runs at 1 Hz. The MPC
prediction horizons were chosen experimentally
to be 15 samples for the outer loop and 12 for
the inner, while the control horizons were chosen
to be 15 and five for the outer and inner loops,
respectively. The outer loop is tuned such that it
will track changes in the references γ and χ˙ while
maintaining the velocity v to within 10m/s of a
setpoint and holding the sideslip angle β at zero.
The pilot’s inputs are bounded by their physical
limitations and a rate limit of 1/2 their full range
per second. The inner loop is tuned such that it
will track the velocity (v,α,β) and the orientation
(φ,θ,ψ) of the reference model. Actuator inputs
are constrained in both magnitude and rate by
their physical limitations (in the failed condition).
Tuning of the fault-tolerant controller was specific
to this scenario and no claim is made that the
controller would work for all failures.
4.4 Results
Simulations were carried out on both the working
and failed nonlinear models using the same con-
troller. The results of the simulations are shown
in Figures 2, 3, and 4. Due to space constraints,
only the lateral channels are shown here, although
the model and controller have six degrees of free-
dom, and control of this asymmetric aircraft re-
quires coordination between the lateral and lon-
gitudinal controls. The full results are available
in (Jones, 2002).
Figure 3 displays the ability of the pilot to control
the plane and track the trajectory required to
lineup with the runway. One can see that the
pilot has sufficient authority to fly the same path
in the failed aeroplane as with the working one.
Figure 4 shows that the pilot is able to control
the damaged aircraft in a manner very similar to
how he flew the nominal craft through the same
manoeuvres; although there is an offset of both
wheel and pedals after the failure, the patterns
of movements of these pilot inputs are the same
as for the working aircraft. This indicates that
the reference model was being successfully tracked
by the fault-tolerant controller and that the pilot
did not need to take any special action in order
to compensate for the damage to the aircraft.
Finally, Figure 2 shows that during the flight
on the damaged plane, the controller has used
the available actuators in a drastically different
fashion from the working case, despite achieving
a similar result. Note also that one of the engines
and one of the rudders are at their physical limits,
indicating that the ability of MPC to handle
constraints was necessary in this example.
Starting from the same initial conditions as in
the real incident about 5 minutes into the flight,
our controller performs similar manoeuvres to
those performed by the real aircraft, but avoids
the condition which led to the fatal crash, and
successfully descends to ground level — though
we have not simulated the final landing flare.
5. CONCLUSIONS
We do not claim to have solved the problem of
fault-tolerant flight control. But we do believe
that the results presented in this paper are suffi-
ciently good and non-trivial to indicate that fault-
tolerant control on the basis of MPC as an ‘imple-
mentation architecture’ is a plausible proposition.
Major problems remain to be solved before the
concept can be considered to be proved. The first
is that considerable tuning of the (inner loop)
MPC controller was necessary in order to obtain
the results shown in the simulation. Either a
faster way of tuning MPC must be found, or a
set of controller parameters must be found which
is generic for a large number of fault conditions
(within the restricted domain of flight control, and
possibly restricted to a single aircraft type).
Another potential problem is that of choos-
ing objectives for the MPC controller. If the
fault/damage is so serious that the original ob-
jectives cannot be met, then a fault-tolerant con-
troller must try to achieve less ambitious objec-
tives. How to detect that condition, and how to
decide what the revised objectives should be, are
questions to which the answers are currently un-
known. An advantage of our model-following for-
mulation is that the MPC controller’s objectives
relate only to following the reference model. This
allows the pilot to use experience and intuition to
moderate the demands made on the aircraft.
An even more fundamental problem is the require-
ment for identification of the effects of a failure
on the aircraft behaviour. Aircraft are compre-
hensively instrumented, and in the case of El Al
1862 there was sufficient time to collect plenty of
data. Furthermore, intuitively it does not appear
to be necessary for the new aircraft behaviour to
be known accurately; even crude information on
some aspects of behaviour might be sufficient. For
example, even after flying the damaged aircraft
for 15 minutes the pilot had not realised that he
had lost both engines on one side of the aircraft,
although he knew that these engines were not
producing any thrust (Smaili, 1997). This had two
effects: firstly, the crew thought that the engines
were probably on fire, and that they therefore had
to land as quickly as possible, and this might have
led them to hasty decisions. Secondly, they did
not consider the possibility that the wing’s aero-
dynamic performance might have changed as a
result of damage. Knowing how much information
about behaviour is needed for effective control,
and how quickly that information can be acquired,
are topics on which very little is known at present,
and which deserve further study. (The existing
literature on fault detection and identification —
such as (Basseville and Nikiforov, 1993) — does
not address such questions.) We note, however,
that there was enough data available on-board
to enable (Smaili, 1997) to derive a model of the
failed aircraft, albeit not in real time.
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